

October 13, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CUTLER

The President is considering making a speech to the United Nations on the atomic threat and on means for reducing the threat by agreements between the free world and the Soviet bloc. The attached pages, prepared at his request, contain the material for the second half of such a speech which would outline his proposals for reducing the threat.

The President would like to have the views of the Planning Board on whether these proposals would be consistent with the security interests of the United States.

The obvious reasons, this should be handled with special security precautions.

John Foster Dulles

Attachment

MATERIAL FOR SECOND HALF OF ATOMIC SPEECH

Basis of Proposals

1. Everyone must recognize that an arms race is not the surest way to preserve peace. Steadily growing armaments increase the risk that war will ultimately result from mistake or design. This is especially true of atomic weapons. When sudden attack can inflict such terrible and immediate devastation on its victims, an aggressor may be tempted to strike with the hope of winning in a single, swift blow. Realizing this, his possible victims must perpetually maintain a state of readiness for defense and massive retaliation. In this uneasy situation, with its incredible premium on time and speed, fear and tension will strain human nerves, steadiness and judgment to the limit. In our world, this danger is enhanced by the specific conflicts still unresolved since World War II.

V. wd grab this.

2. To survive, mankind must ultimately establish a system of world order adequate to end warfare itself and to maintain just and durable peace. War cannot be made humane by outlawing specific weapons. A war which began with conventional weapons would surely end with the use of those which would destroy us all. Thus

- 2 -

mankind can finally secure itself against the horror of atomic warfare only by preventing war itself.

3. To gain time for working toward this essential goal, the first task of all responsible leaders must be to reduce the present danger of a disastrous war. This calls for curtailing sharply the military power on both sides and resolving disputed issues which might breed war.

4. The obstacles are tremendous and must be frankly faced. Today the Soviet bloc and the free world are separated by a deep gulf of distrust and suspicion. Our people believe that the USSR is committed to policies which are designed ultimately to dominate or destroy them. The Soviet leaders profess to believe the same of Western policies. The growing military power of each side and the conflicts over specific issues sharpen this pervading distrust and suspicion.

5. Can nothing be done until this mutual distrust is dissipated? To wait until that time may be to wait too long. We must seek ways to reduce the present danger without waiting to remove the distrust. That may sound impossible. Certainly it will be difficult, but it can be done if both sides want to do it.

*play with words
too subtle.*

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- 3 -

Reduction of Armaments

6. At present, each side has a certain level of military strength. This is made up of various elements combined in differing proportions for each side. In part it is based on atomic and fusion weapons and the means for their delivery. In part it relies on conventional forces and weapons like tanks, planes, artillery and infantry.

7. In terms of its security, what is important to each side is not the absolute strength of its military forces but their relative strength in comparison with those of the other side. Each side could reduce its total armaments to the same degree without affecting its security. But, as already explained, the total size of the armed forces and the threat of atomic weapons do seriously increase the danger of war breaking out. That danger could be materially reduced by restricting the military strength equally on both sides. Despite the existing distrust, both sides could accept such a reduction if they considered that it did not appreciably change the balance of power between them, and was buttressed by safeguards to ensure compliance.

not now!

This is a drastic change from the 1951

formula to appear to accept the Soviet idea of relatively equal reduction.

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~
SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

-4-

8. Despite the obvious difficulties, it is essential to explore the feasibility of such balanced reductions and of suitable safeguards to prevent violations by any nation. Such a study would cover a variety of matters.

9. One primary subject would be the atomic and fusion weapons and the means for their delivery. As early as 1946, while the U.S. had a monopoly on atomic weapons, we proposed to subject them to strict international controls. That proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet Union. Since then these weapons have grown in number and variety and are now possessed by other nations. From the start we have been prepared to consider other methods of control, and we are still open-minded. As part of a balanced reduction of total military strength, we will accept any international machinery for control of atomic and similar weapons if it contains effective safeguards to insure compliance by all nations and to give adequate warning of possible evasion or violation.

10. A balanced plan cannot be confined to atomic and similar weapons. Limits must also be imposed upon

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~
~~SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS~~

-5-

conventional weapons and forces. Otherwise the balance of military strength would be shifted in favor of those countries which maintain the largest conventional armed forces. There must, therefore, be restrictions upon all military forces. This, too, we are prepared to discuss with other interested governments. ✓

Removing Specific Sources of Instability

11. The reduction and control of armaments would itself reduce the risks of war and mitigate tensions. But these can be further reduced if such a program were accompanied by the removal of conditions which might provoke war.

12. The major danger spots are well known. In Europe, there are Germany, Austria, and the Soviet satellites--the nations formerly independent which are now under Soviet domination. In Asia, there are Korea and Indochina, in one of which fighting has only been suspended by an armistice and in the other it still goes on. In each of these areas, the aim should be to create conditions which will promote stability and security for their peoples and their neighbors.

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~
SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

-6-

13. Let us look at Europe in this light.

In the long run, European stability depends on building a firm and lasting friendship between France and Germany, and ending the existing division in Germany. A secure prosperous and peaceful Europe must be based on a united Europe, which includes a unified Germany.

14. The European Defense Community is a major measure toward this goal. The Soviet Union has often expressed its objections to this Community and to German participation. The United States fully understands and shares Soviet opposition to any revival of German militarism or aggression. But the United States is also convinced, by experience, that any attempt to keep Germany as a disarmed vacuum will be doomed to failure and will create instability instead of curing it.

15. Germany's Western neighbors who suffered, as did the Soviet Union, from Hitler's aggressions, also recognize this. With the full cooperation of German leaders, they are seeking to achieve a constructive solution through the European Defense Community. Within it, Germany can contribute to its defense and take part in the building of a peaceful Europe. But the Community

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

-7-

also provides vitally important safeguards against a revival of militarism or future aggression. The armed forces of the Community will be solely for defense, will be under joint control, and will be clearly too limited to threaten any other state. Moreover, the total size of Community forces can be discussed in connection with any program for the limitation of armaments. Doubtless the Community would also be prepared to enter into pacts with the Soviet Union and Eastern European states to provide mutual guarantees against aggression, in furtherance of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States would also be willing to associate itself with such undertakings.

16. If the Soviet Union would agree to German unity, measures could surely be worked out to see that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from East Germany did not prejudice Soviet security. One way which has been suggested is to create a zone in East Germany and in Poland from which all forces would be withdrawn.

17. The so-called satellite states present another source of basic instability in Europe. We can understand

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~
SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

- 8 -

the Soviet desire to have friendly states along its borders, but we cannot approve their subjection to Soviet domination. That method, which builds up latent hatred among these peoples, does not even promote long-term Soviet security. It would be natural for these states to follow foreign policies consistent with Soviet security. The United States would, of course, have no objection to that. But that would be very different from the present domination.

18. The Soviet Union has repeatedly objected to the fact that the United States and its allies have acquired bases near Soviet territory. These bases are dedicated solely to mutual defense of ourselves and our allies against the threat of Soviet aggression, including the danger of Soviet atomic attack. Even so, as part of a balanced plan for the effective control of armaments and resolving other issues, the United States would be prepared to consider limitations of its forces and facilities located outside its borders.

19. In Asia, the outstanding issues should be settled on similar principles. The creation of a unified Korea, secure from foreign control, and the restoration of stable peace in Southeast Asia would

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
SPECIAL SECURITY PRECAUTIONS

- 9 -

provide a basis for resolving other conflicts in that area.

20. Any program such as I have sketched would require safeguards against violation. Such safeguards might take many forms, but they would surely require the services of an agency to carry out inspections and other functions. To perform such functions, I would suggest that the United Nations might organize a body of men whose integrity would be above question, and who would give their primary allegiance to the world community. Such an organ could undertake the tasks of inspecting and enforcing compliance under the agreements to limit armaments and to remove conflicts. I believe that such a body might contribute materially to working out acceptable solutions. In establishing the Peace Observation Commissions, the United Nations has already broken ground along the lines suggested.

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~